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COMMENTS
CLASS DEFAMATION-SCURRILOUS MATTERS IN THE MAIL-FEDERAL
AND STATE REMEDIES.
"Organized Jewry has carried on a coup d'etat and is in com-
mand of the White House palace guard .... What Jewish idealism
and Jewish discontent have so powerfully contributed to accom-
plish in Russia, the same historic qualities of the Jewish mind and
heart are tending to promote in other countries. . . . Bolshevik
leaders [in] Moscow, most of whom are jews ... care little for Russia
or any other country but are internationalists and they are trying
to start a world-wide social revolution. . . . This new Moscovite
brain trust . . . hopes to turn [the] White House coup d'etat into a
complete Jew-controlled bureaucratic dictatorship."
This excerpt is a copy of an item from the files of the General
Counsel of the Post Office Department. The circulation in the mail of such
literature, defaming racial and religious groups, has been the cause of
much public concern and the immediate reaction to such literature is
epitomized in the question, "Is there not some law which will curtail
the circulation of this scurrilous and defamatory matter?" It is the
purpose of this comment to discuss the availability of remedies against
class defamation, to investigate the general reluctance to pursue available
remedies, and to speculate as to the advisability of seeking a remedy.
I.
AVAILABILITY oF REMEDIES AGAINST CLASS DEFAMATION.
A.
Civil Remedies.
Authorities are in agreement that the civil law of defamation has af-
forded little relief to unorganized groups, bound together by race or religion,
but not as a recognizable unit having legal power to sue.' The generality of
1. Belton, The Control of Group Defamation: A Comparative Study of Law
and Its Limitations, 34 TuL. L. Rlv. 469, 470, 480 (1960) ; Whittenberg, Individual
Recovery for Defamation of a Group 15 OHIO ST. L. J. 273 (1954) ; Developments
in the Law of Defamation, 69 HARV. L. R~v. 875, 898 (1956) ; Note, Statutory
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citizens which make up these groups is necessarily a formless and shifting
segment of the population and is incapable by its very nature of coming
into a court of law to defend its rights and reputation. 2 Furthermore, the
class has no economic interest apart from that of its members, nor does
it have a well-defined purpose which would be hampered by a loss of
public confidence.3 Although it is clear that an individual member of
the class can recover for an apparent class defamation if he can show
that the defamation was published with regard to him, this in no way
furnishes a solution for the problem at hand, which, by hypothesis, involves
a de facto class defamation.
Compelled retraction and the injunction have been mentioned as po-
tential civil remedies against class defamation.4 The former has not been
utilized in the United States and would have but a minimal effect in
the light of its compulsory aspect, which would detract from the con-
viction of the retraction. Furthermore, class defamation is ordinarily very
general and cannot be retracted as effectively as a specific charge against
an individual. Injunctions, too, are rare and ineffective since they are
susceptible to the charge of "previous restraint upon publication," unless
only the exact repetition of a defamatory statement is enjoined, in which
case the party enjoined will still have broad latitude within which to
operate.5 It is the present state of the law, therefore, that racial and re-
ligious groups have little, if any, recourse to the civil law in their quest
for a remedy against literature which maligns them as a class.
B.
Criminal Remedies.
(a) Federal Postal Laws.
There is no postal law which bars writings against a particular re-
ligion or race of people, per se. Moreover, the postal laws which deal
with "hate" literature are powerless to curb effectively the type of litera-
ture exposed above, since, of the two relevant provisions of the United
States Code, one is almost wholly ineffective and perhaps inapplicable,
while the other is inapplicable as a practical matter.
All libelous, scurrilous or defamatory matter upon the envelope
or outside cover of the mail, or upon a postal card, is nonmailable, and one
who knowingly deposits such matter for mailing is subject to fine or im-
2. Belton, supra note 1, at 474.
3. Developments in the Law of Defamation, supra note 1, at 898.
4. See note, Statutory Prohibition of Group Defamation, supra note 1, at
609-13, where a model statute is proposed with primarily civil remedies in the
form of compulsory retraction, an injunction against repetition, and the posting
of a bond for a reasonable time, forfeitable upon repetition of the violation of the
statute.
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prisonment. 6 Avoidance of this provision is readily accomplished by en-
closing scurrilous matters in a non-scurrilous envelope. But even where
the very face of the envelope is used to malign a religion or a race of
people, it is extremely doubtful that this provision would be applicable,
since it has been interpreted as being limited to defamation of identifiable
individuals. 7
The second relevant section of the United States Code makes every
indecent article nonmailable and, again, one who knowingly uses the mails
for the mailing of such an article is subject to fine and/or imprisonment.,
By definition, an indecent article includes one of a character tending to
incite arson, murder, or assassination, 9 but as a practical matter, literature
rarely, if ever, attains such a character in this society.
The postal laws, therefore, afford no remedy to a religious or racial
group which is defamed by the circulation in the mails of scurrilous litera-
ture, but by enacting laws which deal with libelous, scurrilous, defamatory
and indecent matter in the mails, Congress has by no means pre-empted
the regulatory field. 10 The federal statute deals only with the actual use
of the mails; it does not eliminate the power of the state to deal with the
manufacture, sale, advertising, publication, presentation or exhibition of
such material. State regulation in these areas in no way imposes a
burden on or interferes with the federal postal functions, and hence is
permissible."
(b) State Criminal Libel Law.
Every state provides a sanction against criminal libel, the majority
of states by statute, and a few states without legislative enactment.' 2
The difficulty has been in applying this law to class defamation, since
generally these statutes have been construed to be applicable only when
the defendant refers to identifiable individuals.1" A number of states have
attempted to fill this void by enacting group libel statutes aimed at punish-
ing those who defame "a class of citizens of any race, color, creed or
religion."'1 4 Although the Supreme Court upheld a conviction under the
Illinois group libel statute in 1952,15 prosecutions under these statutes
remain infrequent and the hatemonger pursues his course of group vili-
fication practically uninhibited.
On the surface, the situation poses itself as an enigma. It is said that
group defamation, which reached its highest peak in the United States
6. 62 Stat. 782 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 1718 (1958).
7. See Am. Civil Liberty Union v. Kiely, 40 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1930).
8. 62 Stat. 768 (1948), as amended, 18 U.S.C. 1461 (1958).
9. Ibid.
10. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 493 (1957).
11. Id. at 494.
12. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255 n.5 (1952).
13. See, e.g., People v. Edmondson, 168 Misc. 142, 154, 4 N.Y.S.2d 257, 268
(N.Y. County Ct. 1938).
14. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 471 (1955).
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in 1942 only to subside during and immediately after World War II, is
again on the rise and has reached significant proportions.16 Group libel
statutes have been enacted in several states for the specific purpose of
counteracting class vilification, 17 and a truly representative statute has
been upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court.' In states which
lack a group libel statute, defamed groups are often large enough or
powerful enough that they could effect such a statute through lobbying
activities. Yet most states still fail to provide a remedy against group
defamation and, even in the states with group libel statutes, prosecutions
are so rare as to be almost nonexistent.1 9
One explanation advanced for this apparent enigma is that the
Supreme Court's decision in Beauharnais v. Illinois20 is not strong authority
for the proposition that statutes comparable to the Illinois statute are
constitutional. It has been suggested that, if a flurry of enactments similar
to the Illionis statute were forth-coming, the multiple objections raised
in the four strong dissents, echoed and amplified by virtually unanimous
law review criticism of the decision, might well prevail in a later court. 21
Criticism of the decision centers around the right of free speech, and
the weakness of the decision is said to be in the vagueness of the statute
and the rejection of a clear and present danger test.22 The majority had
found the statute but a form of criminal libel law, the meaning of which is
discoverable in the history and practice of Illinois, and for this reason
it was held to be definite enough to satisfy constitutional requirements. 23
It was then decided that the clear and present test was inapplicable since
libelous utterances are not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech.
2 4
Rather than go into the merits of the criticism of this decision, it is
submitted that the doubtful authority of Beauharnais is not the basic
explanation for the failure to curtail class defamation through group libel
statutes. It is true that the defamatory conduct in Beauharnais was so
clearly a violation of the statute that the defendant could not have been
without notice, 25 so that vagueness was not as pointed an issue as it would
be in the case of a less flagrant violation. 26 But it is submitted that the
material introductory to this comment is no less flagrant, that anti-Negro
material not unlike that in Beauharnais is constantly pervading the mails,
that organizations interested in the welfare of the groups defamed will not
16. Belton, supra note 1, at 300.
17. Id. at 305-10.
18. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
19. Leflar, supra note 5, at 984.
20. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
21. Belton, supra note 1, at 309-10.
22. Id. at 308-09; Developments in the Law of Defamation, supra note 1, at
900-01.
23. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 253 (1952).
24. Id. at 266.
25. Defendant had distributed handbills vehemently attacking the negro race.
26. Developments in the Law of Defamation, supra note 1, at 900.
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be deterred from litigation where an adverse ruling due to the vagueness
of the statute under which they seek relief is merely possible, as opposed to
probable or certain. It is true that stimulation of racial tensions is not
as likely in the case of a private communication in the mail as in the case
of communication in public, and that, although Mr. Justice Frankfurter
concluded that it was unnecessary to consider the clear and present danger
doctrine on the premise that libelous utterances are not within the area
of constitutionally protected speech,27 he nonetheless emphasized the
tense racial relations in the Chicago area where the defendant had circu-
lated the anti-Negro handbills. 28 Yet Mr. Justice Frankfurter's premise
for not considering the clear and present danger doctrine has been
recently reiterated while upholding a state obscenity statute without
applying, in fact while expressly rejecting, the clear and present danger
doctrine. 29 It seems, then, that the reference in Beauharnais to racial
tension was dictum and should not deter those who would derive shelter
under a group libel statute.
Nor should it be suggested that the authors of scurrilous material
confine their activity to locales where group libel will not be punished.
Bigotry is not of such a nature as to be governed by rational calculation.
Moreover, the authors of this material would ordinarily welcome the
publicity that is attendant upon so palatable a lawsuit.
It is submitted, then, that whenever racial and religious groups have
been viciously maligned by way of scurrility in the mails, they could have
sought recourse, and not hopelessly, in group libel statutes in group libel
jurisdictions. And in jurisdictions where group libel statutes have not been
enacted, these racial and religious groups could have sought recourse,
and again not hopelessly, in promoting legislation through lobbying
activities, at least in states that are susceptible to the influence of Catholics,
Negroes, and Jews. But why the general reluctance to pursue these
potentially available remedies?
II.
REASONS FOR LACK OF CLASS DEFAMATION LITIGATION.
It has been urged frequently that the enactment of group legislation
is inadvisable.30 The reasons for this exhortation are very probably the
same reasons for which there has been a reluctance on the part of op-
pressed minorities to pursue remedies against class vilification.
Interferences with freedom of speech and of the press which bring
group libel laws to the verge of unconstitutionality are also thought to
27. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952).
28. Id. at 258-59.
29. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486 (1957).
30. Beth, Group Libel and Free Speech, 39 MINN. L. Rzv. 180-84 (1955);
Leflar, supra note 5, at 1030-31; Developments in the Law of Defamation, supra
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bring them even closer to the verge of social unwisdom and political
viciousness. 31 The liberal attitude is that only good can evolve from
unrestrained expression and discussion, so that the thrashing out of ideas,
however radical and pernicious, is the most desirable method of arriving
at sound social and political thought. Very often it is the firm advocate of
civil liberties who is the most resolute force behind the oppressed minority
group. But it would be paradoxical to find this liberal element working
in the camp of the maligned minority group in a class defamation suit,
the necessary effect of which is to restrain free expression. Thus, it
would seem that the primacy of expression can be assigned as a reason
for the general reluctance to pursue the remedies potentially available in
group libel legislation.
A second reason that may be assigned to the lack of litigation in
the area of class defamation is that truth and good motives will often
become an issue,32 and the consequent publicity might have an effect
that is adverse to the already injured class.33 It is quite conceivable that
a trial for the crime of group libel could result in a trial of the class de-
famed with all the attendant adverse publicity, since truth and good
motives can hardly be dispensed with in any class defamation suit. But
seldom would a group be willing to expose its reputation to a court-
room debate, so certain to stir widespread publicity, especially since the
mere raising of a question concerning the good name of a class is usually
enough to sully its reputation in the eyes of an impressionable public.
The adverse effect of a class defamation suit, which quite naturally
results in the avoidance of group libel litigation, can be realized in other
respects also. The publicity that would be given to the prosecution of
such a suit might very readily serve to enkindle latent prejudices against the
defamed group and in behalf of the defendant, and a series of suits prose-
cuted by the same class might easily lead to increased hostility against
that class, since public opinion might rebel against singling out that
class for protection. Furthermore, the mere possibility of an acquittal
will serve as a deterrent to a group libel suit since an acquittal would
appear to many to be an official vindication of the defendant's conduct.34
And even a conviction, if as infrequent as in the past, might evoke
public sympathy rather than contempt,35 so that hatemongers would
become martyrs and their causes would become enhanced. Thus, a few
cases of unwise convictions, a few martyrs, a few exaggerated headlines
could more than cancel out the good intentions of the law.36
One further adverse effect which would result from class defamation
suits is that the prosecution of the suit will furnish the hatemonger with
31. Leflar, supra note 5, at 1030.
32. Beth, supra note 30, at 181.
33. Id. at 181-82; Developments in the Law of Defamation, supra note 1, at 901.
34. Developments in the Law of Defamation, supra note 1, at 901.
35. Ibid.
36. Beth, supra note 30, at 182.
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a rostrum, as well as the oppressed. The attendant newspaper coverage
will offer to the hatemonger his largest audience, and such a prospect is
generally welcomed by those who make a practice of publishing "hate"
literature. Evidence of this fact may be found in the following excerpt,
again from the files of the General Counsel of the Post Office Department.
"[One] magazine has a long story full of smears this month
on us, but it is bringing us more strength and fighting young
men, - so we don't mind the smears! [Another] magazine is sup-
posed to be out in a few days with a big spread on our fight for
the White Man! In short, we have smashed the silent treatment!
III.
CONCLUSION.
The scurrilous matters that are constantly pervading our mails today
present a twofold problem the first part of which is embodied in the
question, "Is there a remedy for the oppressed?", and the second part
of which may be phrased, "Should the oppressed pursue a remedy?"
It is submitted that the defamed classes have a potential remedy
in group libel statutes, which are already existent in some jurisdictions
and which could be successfully lobbied for in several other jurisdictions.
These statutes, properly drawn, would be effective to eliminate at least
the most abusive scurrility, as in the Beauharnais case. It is submitted,
however, that unless there are exceptional circumstances, it is better that
the abused refrain from the pursuit of a remedy, not because of the
primacy of free speech, since libelous utterances are not within the area
of constitutionally protected speech, but because the pursuit of a remedy
will more likely inure to the benefit of the wrongdoer and to the further
detriment of the class which was wronged.
L. Francis Murphy
COPYRIGHTS-RIGHTS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
AND ITS EMPLOYEES.'
Within the United States, a voluminous amount of literature is pro-
duced annually. But for sheer number and variety, publications of the
federal government by far exceed those of any other government or
commercial publisher.2 In size they range from pamphlets to ponderous
1. This comment has been entered in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition
on phases of copyright law.
2. It has been estimated that in a given year the total number of all classes of
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volumes; and in scope they vary from articles with popular appeal to
technical treatises of value only to the trained scientist. These publica-
tions are not limited to mere dry statistical records, but rather, cover all
phases of human life.3
Although the publications of the United States Government are quite
comprehensive, the same cannot be said for the copyright law applicable
to them. Only one brief section of the copyright statute refers to the
United States Government.4 Nor are the confines of the statute clearly
illuminated by case law, for the lower federal courts have spoken few times
in this area,5 and the Supreme Court not at all. 6 Moreover, as of this
date, there has been a notable lack of comment on this area of copyright
law. 7 Therefore, recognizing that the scope of federal government activities
is continuously being broadened, and that citizens, now, more than ever
before, look to federal agencies for information, it is the purpose of this
comment to investigate the interrelation of the United States Government,
its employees, and the general public in the field of copyright law, with
emphasis on Section 8 of the copyright statute itself. This section states:
"No copyright shall subsist ...in any publication of the United
States Government, or any reprint, in whole or in part thereof...
The publication or republication by the Government, either
separately or in a public document, of any material in which copy-
right is subsisting shall not be taken to cause any abridgement or
annulment of the copyright or to authorize any use or appropriation
of such copyright material without the consent of the copyright pro-
prietor."
The first part of this comment will discuss the denial of copyright
privilege to Government publications. The next part will concern itself
with the relationship of the United States Government and its employees.
These employees often use Government facilities, time and materials in
Gto. WASH. L. Rzv. 423 (1955). It is further estimated that the Government prints
about 70 million different publications a year. See PRINTERS ANNUAL REPORT,
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFICE 1957.
3. For an excellent guide-book on what sources of information the Government
has available, and how such sources may be procured, see SCHM4CK4BIER & EASTIN,
GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS AND THEIR USE (2d ed. 1961).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 8 (1952).
5. The District Court in a recent case, Public Affairs Associates v. Rickover,
177 F. Supp. 601, 603 (D.D.C. 1959), noted, regarding the rights of Government
employees to copyright, that "although Government officers and employees have
been the authors of speeches, articles, addresses, pamphlets, books and other writings
on numerous subjects at different times from the early years of the Republic, the
question here presented does not appear to have been raised in any reported case
decided by any appellate court."
6. However, the Supreme Court has handed down memorandum decisions.
7. Among the few articles in this area are: Gunnels, Copyright Protection for
Writers Employed by the Federal Government, 2 WASH. U.L.Q. 182 (1960);
Stiefel, Piracy in High Places, 24 GEo. WASH. L. Rnv. 423 (1955).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 8 (1952).
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producing works which they may later seek to copyright. An attempt
will be made to clarify the rights of the United States and its employees in
these situations.
T.
PUBLICATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.
A.
The Denial of Copyright.
In the field of patents, no restraints are placed upon the United States
Government. The United States has full freedom to secure a patent, and
full power to protect any patent so secured from infringement. 9 Why then
did Congress in framing the copyright law deny the United States Govern-
ment the right to copyright? Two possible answers may be suggested:
(1) The United States desired to give its citizens full access to any
information it had, and a Government copyright would serve
only as a barrier to this access.' 0
(2) It would be too much trouble for the United States to secure
copyrights for the voluminous amount of publications which
issue forth from its offices.
In England, Parliament has given to the Crown the privilege to
copyright public documents," although in fact it is exercised sparingly. 12
There seems to be no reason why Congress could not give a similar
right to our Government, if it so desired.' However, the course followed
by Congress in denying copyright protection to Government publications
seems to be a prudent one. As a United States circuit judge said, this
restraint placed on government "is designed to achieve in a democracy
that depends upon accurate public knowledge the broadest publicity for
matters of government." 14
Our society prides itself on the free dissemination of ideas. This is
our heritage, and a right of copyright in the Government would be
incompatible with it. The decisions of the Supreme Court safeguarding
the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression clearly show
9. Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342 (1890); James v. Campbell, 104
U.S. 356, 358 (1881). See FOREMAN, PATENTS - GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP AND
ADMINISTRATION ch. I1 (1957), where the constiutional and statutory basis of
Government ownership in patents is discussed, along with the policy reasons behind
such ownership.
10. See infra, note 15.
11. Crown Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 GEo. V, c. 46, § 18.
12. See generally Stiefel, Piracy in High Places, 24 GEo. WASH. L. Rv.
423, 436 (1955).
13. See DRONE, LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS 162, 164(1879).
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the emphasis placed on wide dissemination of ideas. 15 Conversely, in the
patent field the same demand is lacking. True, patents will involve ideas.
However, they are embodied in a concrete form, set in a business back-
ground and pure diffusion of ideas is not their essence. 16
There are, however, situations in which a Government copyright
would seem desirable. Often Government publications which have been
made available to the public are distorted by private publishers. Unlike
the private individual who can secure a copyright, 17 the Government,
unable to secure one, is without a remedy under the statute. Further-
more, the public itself may be denied protection where Government
publications are copied by publishers, who omit the source, and in turn
sell the literary product as a private publication at a higher price. The
Federal Trade Commission to an extent has acted on this problem,' 8
through use of the "cease and desist" order, but generally it has acted
only in the area of misrepresentation and false advertising.19
Thus it seems that fuller protection would be accorded Government
publications if a copyright could be secured for them. Apparently, how-
ever, Congress felt the interest of the public to make whatever use it
desires of materials and publications produced by the Government far
outweighs any need to prevent possible abuses which may take place
through distortion, misrepresentation, or excessive pricing of Government
publications when they are privately reproduced. This seems to be sound
policy, especially when other avenues are open to prevent such abuses.
For example, there seems to be no sound reason why the Congress could
not amend the copyright statute to provide a fine or even imprisonment
for anyone seeking to abuse Government publications in the aforementioned
ways.2
0
15. See Mr. Justice Roberts concurring in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516
(1945): "The right to express thoughts freely and to disseminate ideas fully is
secured by the Constitution as basic to the conception of our government."
16. See FORMAN, PATENTS - GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP AND ADMINISTRATION
61, 62, where the author gives two principal reasons why the Government should
be able to procure a patent: (1) as a means of self-defense against suits for in-
junction or infringement; (2) for the purpose of giving the government a strong
bargaining position in exchanging its patents with those of private industry.
17. The protection of copyright proprietors from distortion of their works has
become known as the doctrine of "Moral Right". See Roeder, The Doctrine of
Moral Right, 53 HARV. L. Rev. 554 (1940).
18. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction only when interstate com-
merce is affected and the public interest is involved. F.T.C. v. Bunte, 312 U.S. 349
(1941).
19. See, e.g., 43 F.T.C. 756 (1946), where the parties who sold "Belt and
Vitalized Soles" agreed that they would cease to advertise for commercial purposes
any confidential report of Government tests, and further agreed not to use such
reports; See also 46 F.T.C. 1205 (1949), where an individual offered a booklet for
sale entitled "Establishing and Operating a Real Estate and Insurance Brokerage
Business". He was forced to cease representing that substantially the same infor-
mation could not be obtained for less than the two dollar price which he charged.
20. But see H.R. REP. No. 3892, 57th Cong., 2d Sess. (1903), where such
a proposal was recommended by a Congressional Committee, but rejected.
[VOL. 6
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What is a Government Publication?
Although no clarification of the meaning of "publication of the United
States Government" appears in the Rules and Regulations of the Copy-
right Office, 21 historical background is not wanting. The language of the
provision originated in the Act for Public Printing, 22 the effect of which
is best indicated by the court in Public Affairs Associates v. Rickover,
the most recent case in this area:
"The language of the original statute on printing - 'No . . .
Government publication shall be copyrighted' - seems to refer to
a publication actually produced by the Public Printer. The Printing
Office provision seems to mean, if read naturally 'produced in that
office'. The Copyright provision should be read, we think, to refer
to publication commissioned or printed at the cost and direction of the
United States. These would be authorized expositions on matters of
governmental interest by governmental authority. '23
Thus in light of the original statute, it seems that before a publication
will be labeled as governmental, it must be commissioned or printed at the
cost and direction of the United States.
Prior cases involving a Governmental publication have not had to
define the term. Usually the material in question is admitted to be a
Government publication and the issue is whether the alleged infringer has
sufficiently varied the work to take it out of that category. The litigation
generally originates when a plaintiff sues for infringement of his copyright,
and the defendant answers that the work allegedly infringed upon is a
Government publication and therefore not subject to copyright. The
ultimate decision will rest on whether plaintiff has varied the Government
publication enough that it can be said to be his own creation. The'same
considerations are involved when a court has before it a previously copy-
righted work and the defendant, having been sued for infringement, claims
that he has sufficiently varied the original as to merit a new privilege
of copyright. 24
In Eggers v. Sun Sales Co.,25 plaintiff had incorporated General
Pershing's cfficial report to the Secretary of War in his copyrighted
21. 37 C.F.R. § 201.1-201.8 (1960).
22. Act for Public Printing, 28 Stat. 608 (1895), 44 U.S.C. § 58 (1928).
23. Public Affairs Associates v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262, 268 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
It should be noted that the Circuit Court reversed and remanded this case, because
it thought that Admiral Rickover, in distributing his speeches to the press and to a
few members of the public who had asked for them, had gone beyond the bounds of
a "limited publication" which the statute allows and thus lost his right to copyright.
However, as to the discussion concerning the privilege of Government employees to
copyright, both courts were in accord.
24. See, Rossett, Burlesque as Copyright Infringement, in ASCAP, Copyright
Law Symposium Number Nine 1, 9 (1958).
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publication, and charged that defendant had infringed his copyright.
The court held that this was an official document of the United States
Government which anyone was free to print and publish, that plaintiff
had no right to a copyright in the first place, and that therefore the
infringement actioft would not lie. Du Puy v. Post Telegram Co. 6
presented a similar issue. A newspaper article entitled "Peace Day in
Uncle Sam's Schools" was substantially copied from a bulletin which the
United States Bureau of Education had prepared and circulated. The
newspaper sought to assert infringement against a subsequent copier, but
the court ruled that the story was not a subject which could be copy-
righted, having come verbatim from a ,governmental publication, without
any original authorship in the newspaper.2
If there is sufficient variation, however, private individuals will be
allowed full latitude to procure a copyright, even though their work is
based on a Government publication. In Hanson v. Jaccard Jewelry Co.,28
plaintiff had made compilations from public documents and arranged the
data to show readily the chronological order of dates of certain historical
events such as battles, number of casualties, and forces engaged. The court
held the compilations to be a valid subject of copyright, because it formed
a valuable source of information and was created by original authorship,
since plaintiff's own labor, care and skill were involved to a sufficient
degree. Similarly in Hengst v. Early & Deniel Co.,29 although the court
denied copyright protection to a gestation table for hogs, it nevertheless
suggested that if a little independent effort had been used by the creator,
instead of copying merely verbatim from Government publications, it
would have been a valid subject of copyright.
It is thus apparent that if a work is actually printed by the Govern-
ment through its printing office, or through one commissioned by it,
it will be labeled a Government publication. Also, as the cases indicate,
if the Government publication is sufficiently varied by individual effort
and originality, a copyright in the resulting work is possible.
II.
THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE SITUATION.
A.
The Problem and Its Cause.
Perhaps the best method of introducing this problem is to set forth
an actual case which has recently come before both the District and Circuit
26. 210 Fed. 883 (3rd Cir. 1914).
27. For other cases in which a Government publication was involved, see
Greenbie v. Noble 151 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), (government historical records) ;
Woodman v. Lydiard Peterson Co., 192 Fed. 67 (C.C.D. Minn.), (government map).For a case where a state government publication was involved, see New Jersey
Motor List Co. v. Barton Business Service, 57 F.2d 353 (D.N.J. 1931).
28. 32 Fed. 202 (C.C.E.C. Mo. 1887).
29. 59 F. Supp. 8 (S.D. Ohio 1945).
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courts of the District of Columbia, and which will be the focal point of
the discussion concerning Government employees. This case, Public
Affairs Associates Inc. v. Rickover,30 involved a suit by a publishing house
against Vice Admiral Rickover of the United States Navy, to secure a declara-
tory judgment that the Admiral had no property rights in certain speeches he
had delivered.31 Some of the speeches dealt with ideas that he had
developed in connection with his activities as a Naval officer, and others
dealt with the subject of education; they were prepared either at home
after normal working hours or while travelling. The final drafts of the
speeches were completed, however, in the Admiral's office, and they were
multilithed on Government duplicating machines. When released, they
bore his name, rank in the United States Navy, and his title on the
Atomic Energy Commission. Plaintiff, an educational publishing house,
claimed that Admiral Rickover had refused it the right to "use, quote
or publish" speeches which he had made in his capacity as a Government
official. Plaintiff maintained his right to publish because Rickover had
used "facilities, information and data obtained in connection with his
duties as a public official."
Thus the line of conflict is sharply drawn. Plaintiff, a member of the
public, claims that as a taxpayer he, in conjunction with his fellow
citizens, is the overseer of the Government employee, since he ultimately
pays his wages and hires him through the medium of the United States
Government. As the ultimate employer, he argues that he is entitled to
the fruits of any idea his employee gleaned from information and data
received in Government service, especially if Government time and facilities
were utilized. Defendant Government employee will dissent and argue that
he should not have to mortgage the products of his brain any more than any
other citizen simply because he saw fit to serve his Government. He will
further assert that the work he seeks to copyright did not arise specifically
as part of his official duties, and thus the Government should not be
entitled to it.
It is only logical when a conflict arises between an employer and
an employee as to who is entitled to the fruits of the employee's labors,
to explore the contract of employment.32 Such contract will generally
either expressly or by implication show the intention of the parties. This
presents little difficulty when dealing with more tangible considerations.
33
But in the copyright area, certain considerations are present which are
not present in the ordinary work world of employers and employees.
Conflicts arise between employer and employee in the copyright cases
for two possible reasons:
30. 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
31. Id. at 265 for a list of the twenty-three speeches involved.
32. See StAVEY, STUDMS IN AG.NcY, 69, 70 (1949).
33. For example, when a question arises as to who, between employer and em-
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(1) Parties are realistic. They will seldom sit down and spell out
rights in something which may only perchance become a proper
subject of copyright.
(2) The controversy over who is entitled to the literary work,
employer or employee, arises, as a rule, quite unexpectedly -
and generally as a collateral matter.
The Rickover case is a clear illustration. Neither the Government nor
Rickover obviously anticipated that Rickover's speeches would become
the basis of a copyright controversy. As a general matter, the parties will
stipulate as to their respective rights in the literary products only in
limited situations, such as when the employer is a publishing house or a
producer of a show, and hires the employee to engage in endeavors which
by their very nature will ultimately involve the securing of copyright
protection.
B.
The Need For A Distinction.
The inference from the Rickover opinion is that before a Government
employee can be denied any right to copyright a twofold standard must
be met: (1) his work must have been produced during the course of his
governmental duties; (2) his work must be actually printed and pub-
lished by the United States Government.3 4
This interpretation though would seem to give too broad a protection
to the employee. Unquestionably many works are produced by Government
employees during the course of their employment but are never published.
Should not the. public rather than the employee be entitled to benefit from
them? The following language of the court in Rickover at the close of
its discussion, indicates that either it had inadvertently failed to consider
this situation earlier or that it intended this language to qualify the forepart
of its opinion:
"It cannot be properly said, as appellant asserted, that a govern-
ment official who speaks or writes of matters with which he is con-
cerned as an official is by the very fact of being such an official
barred from copyright on his productions. If they are statements
called for by his official duties or explanations as guides for official
action they are barred from a copyright."35
34. The court, after stressing the need for actual publication, said case law
supported this conclusion. However, the three cases cited in support of this were
mainly concerned with investigating the employer-employee relationship. Actual
publication had taken place so this point was really not at issue. The cases cited
were: United States v. First Trust Co., 251 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1958) ; Sawyer
v. Crowell Publishing Co., 56 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Sherrill v. Grieves,
57 Wash. Law Reg. 286 (Sup. Ct. D.C. 1929).
35. Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262, 269. (D.D.C. 1960).
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It is here that a distinction should be made. Section 8 of the copy-
right statute, "No copyright shall subsist in any publication of the United
States Government," was meant to cover only publications. Thus,
publications belonging to the Government cannot be copyrighted, and the
public is given free access to them. But section 8 cannot be used to solve
the Government employee cases where there is no actual publication.
Neither was it meant to cover them, nor can any feat of statutory in-
terpretation bring them within its ambit.36 Rather, ordinary principles of
agency must be resorted to. The applicable rule would be simple. The
public, acting through the Government, should be entitled to the work
product produced as a part of the official duties of its agents in the same
way as any other principal would be. Moreover, it should be noted that
in the situation involving a Government employee, if the copyright
statute is sought as authority, the appropriate section to refer to would
be section 26, rather than Section 8. Section 26 states that the word author
as used in this act "shall include an employer in the case of works made
for hire."'37 Thus, although this section refers to the private employer, we
can draw from it the principle that an employer who hires someone to
write for him, has the same right in the latter's writings that an inde-
pendent writer has in his own.
C.
Judicial Treatment.
As a starting point, a reference to the Rickover case will be ex-
pedient. The District Court decision gave a classification system which is
a useful aid in focusing on the uncertain area of the Government employee
problem.38
The first classification consists of publications in which the officer
or employee is hired to specifically write for the Government. Such
publications would belong to the Government employer. The court listed
as examples: maps prepared by employees of the Geological Survey,
manuals issued by various Government departments, Bulletins of the
Department of Agriculture, and histories of military or naval operations
prepared by a Division of Military or Naval History of the Department of
Defense.39
36. But see, Article 8 of the Turkish Copyright Law of 1951. The Turkish
Statute expressly includes Government employees and vests the copyright in the
employer unless "the contrary results either from a contract between the parties
concerned or the nature of the work . .
37. 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1952).
38. Public Affairs Associates v. Rickover, 177 F. Supp. 601, 603 (D.C.C. 1959).
39. See Heine v. Appleton, 11 Fed. Cas. 1031 (No. 6,324) (S.D.N.Y. 1857),
where the plaintiff was an artist who accompanied Commodore Perry to Japan. He
was hired with the express understanding that whatever pictures or drawings he
might produce during the journey would belong solely to the United States Govern-
ment. Plaintiff made a number of drawings which were incorporated into the
Government report of the expedition. The court held that since plaintiff produced
the drawings expressly pursuant to the terms of the employment contract, they
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The second category involves literary products of Government officers
or employees which have no connection whatever with the official actions of
the author. In this situation the Government employee brings the mate-
rial into being solely on his own time and at his own expense with no
connection whatever between the subject matter of the material and his
paid job functions. 40 Here it is indisputable that the individual should
enjoy the benefit of his voluntary non-compensated efforts, regardless of
the fact of his Government employ.
The third category of publications involving Government employees
lies in the "gray area" between the extremes of material produced within
the scope of the employee's paid duties, and material produced wholely
without. In this category, literary property is created incident to the
main purpose of employment, or in the course of a general as opposed
to a specific employment. The material may be produced during working
hours; Government machinery may be utilized; and generally the mate-
rial produced will have some relationship to the job activities. In analyzing
this category, courts have had little precedent from which to draw.
In Sherrill v. Grieves,41 one of the earlier cases involving a Govern-
ment employee, plaintiff was an army officer, teaching topography in an
army school. In need of a text book, plaintiff decided to prepare one on
his off duty hours. Before the book was completed or copyrighted, a part
of the material was incorporated into pamphlet form at a Government print
shop and distributed with plaintiff's permission to the students at the
army school. Later plaintiff obtained a copyright for the book. Defendant
challenged plaintiff's right to obtain a copyright in that part of the book
which had been reproduced in the pamphlet. The court held for plaintiff.
He was considered to be the same as a professor at any other institute of
learning who is not obliged as part of his duties to reduce his lectures to
writing; if he chooses to do so, the writing does not become the prop-
erty of the institution employing him.
In Sawyer v. Crowell Publishing Co.,4 2 plaintiff claimed defendant
had infringed his copyright in a map by reproducing the map in a
national magazine without his permission. Defendant maintained that due
to its governmental character the map became part of the public domain.
Plaintiff, executive assistant to the Secretary of the Interior, had been
sent to investigate the reindeer situation in Alaska, and, as he later ad-
mitted on cross-examination, to make a general survey of the area. On
his return to the United States, he directed a Government employee to
assist him in drawing the map on Government time. The map was
engraved and printed through facilities of the United States Geological
40. Rickover listed the following examples of writers who produced their
writings while in government service: Washington Irving, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Lew
Wallace and Walt Whitman.
41. 57 Wash. Law Rep. 286 (Sup. Ct. D.C. 1929).
42. 46 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), Aff'd, 142 F.2d 497 (2nd Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 735 (1944).
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Survey, and plaintiff applied for and received a copyright on it in his own
name. Copies of the map were subsequently printed by the United States
Highway Commission, and also the Department of Interior, the copies
crediting plaintiff as the source. The court held that plaintiff had no right
of copyright initially for the map was a Government publication. The
court based their holding on the fact that plaintiff had brought the map
into being while engaged in governmental service, which was related to
the creation of a map, and had produced it on Government time through
the use of Government facilities. The Court was impressed with the fact
that the map was drawn to stress the importance of Alaska, as well as the
need for its development, and this was directly connected with the sub-
ject matter of plaintiff's work; also that both plaintiff and his assistant
were in the full time employment of the Government.
Another significant case in this area, has a historical setting. In
this case, United States v. First Trust Co.,48 Thomas Jefferson,
then President, had commissioned Merriweather Lewis to explore the
Mississippi River to ascertain the most direct and practicable route for
travel. He commanded Lewis:
"Your observations are to be taken with great pains and ac-
curacy, to be entered distinctly and intelligibly for others as well as
yourself, to comprehend all the elements necessary, with the aid of the
usual table, to fix the latitude and longitude of the places at which
they were taken, and are to be rendered to the war office..."
Lewis persuaded Clark, his lifelong friend to go along on the expedition
with him, making Clark a co-commander. Lewis kept notes as directed by
Jefferson, and Clark did likewise, although he had not been specifically
requested. The Government's position was that Clark, being a co-
commander with Lewis, was likewise within the ambit of Jefferson's
commands, and that the rough notes taken by Clark became and con-
tinued to be the property of the Government. However, the court held
that the notes written by Clark were not written records of a Government
officer executed in discharge of official duties; they were not, therefore,
public documents and ownership was not in the United States.
This problem was most recently examined in Rickover, specifically
as to whether the material in question was produced as part of the
Government employee's official duties; it was held that Admiral Rickover's
duties did not include making speeches. The court said, "If they are
statements called for by his official duties or explanations as guides for
official action they are barred from a copyright.
In all the cases mentioned in this section, there was a governmental
connection. In Sherrill, many of the ideas and problems incorporated in
the officer's textbook obviously became known to him while teaching on
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Government time. In Sawyer, the area the Government official was sent
to investigate became the subject of his map. In First Trust Co., Clark
took notes on precisely the points which the expedition was sent to in-
vestigate. In Rickover, much of the information which formed the
nucleus of Rickover's speeches, such as those concerning atomic energy,
and submarines, was acquired in his position as an Admiral. Also in all
these cases, an argument for general employment could be made. In
Sherrill, it could be contended that formulating a textbook was part of
plaintiff's duty as an army instructor. In Sawyer, it might be said that
part of the employee's general duties of survey included drawing up a
map. In First Trust Company, the argument might be made that the
general purpose of the expedition and the duty of all on it, were to make
observations, and Clark's notes were merely part of these observations.
Similarly, in Rickover the Admiral's speeches might well have been con-
sidered within the scope of his official duties as a report of a Government
officer to interested segments of the public for the execution of his program,
or even as carrying out the public relations aspect of his job. However, in
the cases cited, with the exception of Sawyer, the courts gave minor
consideration to these points and held an employee to be entitled to
copyright protection in any material which is not the specific thing
which his duties required him to produce. The court in Sawyer, on the
other hand, was satisfied that the material was produced as a general rather
than a specific part of the employees duties. It was enough that the map
produced was connected with the official general duties of making a survey
of Alaska, and that Government time and facilities were used. The
difference in approach is evident. The other courts would ask, "Was the
material in question produced as part of the employee's specific duties ?-44
The court in Sawyer would merely ask, "Was the material in question
produced in connection with the employee's official duties ?' 4 5
The private employer-employee cases would seem to follow the former
rule. In Brown v. Molle Co.,46 the employee had been hired to create and
direct a show for the Molle Company. In the course of preparing the show,
employee found it necessary to use a theme song. The employee wrote
44. A strong argument in favor of the employee can be made from the copyright
statute itself. Section 26, embodied in 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1958) states: "that the word
author as used in this act shall include an employer in the case of works made for
hire". This clause, by its language seems to indicate that before an employer
could secure the rights to his employee's works, there must have been a clear
business understanding at the outset of the employment that the employee paid duties
would include production of the material in question or that if any such material
should be produced, it would belong solely to the employer.
45. It is interesting to observe that in the defamation area, statements by
public officials are held privileged if reasonably related to matters committed to the
officials control or supervision. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) ; Spalding v.
Villas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896). This is in a sense paradoxical, for the purpose of such
a broad definition in the defamation area is to encourage full statement by public
officials; whereas the same purpose is served in the copyright area by restricting the
definition of official duties.
46. 20 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
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the theme song and it was used on the program. The court held the
employee was not entitled to copyright the song. "Where an employee
creates something as part of his duties under his employment, the thing
created is the. property of the employer." Similarly, in United States
Ozone Co. v. United States Ozone Co. of America,4 7 the court held that
a book prepared by an employee, though registered in his name, was the
property of the employer, because it was prepared as part of his duties.
D.
The Judicial Opinion and Patent Cases.
A specialized form of the Government employee problem involves
court decisions. In Wheaton v. Peters,48 the Supreme Court declared that
federal judicial opinions published under the authority of Congress were
not copyrightable. However, they remanded the case to the trial court to
ascertain whether Wheaton had complied with copyright statute as to
his own notes on the cases. Thus by implication, the Court recognized that
although reporting the opinions was part of the reporter's specific duties,
commenting upon them was not.
In another case involving judicial opinions, this time those of a state
court, the Supreme Court had this to say:
"Even though a reporter may be a sworn public officer, ap-
pointed by the authority of the Government which creates the court
of which he is made reporter, and even though he may be paid a
fixed salary for the labors, yet in the absence of any inhibition for-
bidding him to take a copyright for that which is the lawful subject of
copyright in him . . . he is not deprived of the privilege of taking out
a copyright which would otherwise exist. There is, in such a case,
a tacit assent by the Government to his exercising such privilege.
The universal practical construction has been that such right exists,
unless it is affirmatively forbidden or taken away". 49
Although these cases are in a sense unique, they nevertheless clearly
indicate that the Supreme Court was not adverse to giving Government
employees a wide leeway to procure copyrights. There would seem to
be a thin line between the reporting and the editing of judicial opinions,
but apparently the Court thought that since the employees were hired
specifically to report, the disability to copyright is limited to the actual
reports.
In resolving the Government employee problem, some assistance may
be obtained from the field of patents where a similar problem often arises.
47. 62 F.2d 881 (7th Cir. 1932).
48. 34 U.S. 594 (1834).
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The copyright area and the patent area are in many ways alike.50 As
said by the District Court in Rickover:
"The two types of property are analogous. Each is intangible.
In each instance the property is an idea in its ultimate analysis. To
be sure, technically a patent covers not the idea of the inventor or
discoverer, but its concrete embodiment. Nevertheless the embodiment
is the product of the idea. So, too, a copyright covers the literary
form of an idea...-51
The position of the Government employee in the copyright field may
still be in doubt, but the Supreme Court has clearly spoken in favor of
the Government employee in the patent field. United States v. Dubilier
Condenser52 was a case involving two scientists who had been employed
by the United States Bureau of Standards. While in the regular course
of performing their official duties in a Government laboratory and with
the use of Government tools and equipment, the two scientists had de-
veloped an original type of radio instrument. The Supreme Court upheld
the scientists' right to patents against the Government claim. The Court
based their decision on the fact that the scientists' employment was
general, and the invention of the instrument was not the precise subject of
their contract of employment.53 Therefore, in the absence of an express
contractual provision which included the specific invention within the
scope of employment, the Government had no right to the invention.5 4
It is interesting to note, however, that by Executive Order No.
10096,55 the federal government has prohibited a recurrence of the
Dubilier situation. This order gives the Government the entire right to
all inventions made by Government employees during working hours and
with Go' ernment facilities; no such official pronouncement, however, has
been made with respect to ownership of material written by Government
personnel. The absence of such a provision may serve as an indication of
the willingness of the Government to abide by existing judicial pro-
nouncements in favor of the Government employee.
50. However, under the doctrine of "shop right" there is a substantial difference.
Under this rule, if an employee creates or develops an invention using the em-
ployer's time and materials so that the employer in effect is the financial sponsor,
then that employer will have an indefeasible license to use that invention in his
business, regardless of any patent right obtained by the employee. Pure Oil Co.
v. Hyman, 95 F.2d 22, 25 (7th Cir. 1938); Brown v. L.V. Marks & Sons, 64
F. Supp. 352, 356 (E.D. Ky. 1946). No such doctrine exists in the field of copy-
right.
51. Public Affairs Associates v. Rickover, 177 F. Supp. 603 (D.D.C. 1959),
reversed and remanded on other grounds, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
52. 289 U.S. 178 (1933).
53. But see Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342 (1890), where the Court,
using a less strict test, held for the Government.
54. See R9STAv'MXNT, AGENCY § 397: (1937), which likewise favors the employee
in patent cases, although its language is not as cogent as Dubilier. It states:
"Unless otherwise agreed a person employed by another to do non-inventive work
is entitled to patents which are the result of his invention although the invention is
due to the work for which he is employed."
55. Exec. Order No. 10096, 15 Fed. Reg. 389 (1950) as amended.
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E.
Policy Considerations and a Solution.
Policy, in a sense, plays a part in every phase of the law. The situa-
tion involving the Government employee is no exception. For the sake of
comparison, a list will be made of possible policy arguments on both sides,
most of which have been extracted from cases cited previously in this
article. An appraisal will follow immediately thereafter.
Some arguments in favor of giving the Government employee free
rein to copyright, except when part of his official duties are involved, are:
(1) There is a strong personal tie between the author and his works
and as a matter of fairness the actual author should be given as
much protection as possible and should be the actual beneficiary
of the copyright law.56
(2) It is rare that an employee can expressly reserve his right by
contract because of inequality of bargaining power at the time
the contract of employment is made.
(3) An employer may secure a transfer of rights by incorporating
a provision for assignment into the contract of employment and
it seems undesirable to prevent the author from enjoying the
right to sale, distribution, or other use of his intellectual crea-
tions unless he would have naturally anticipated such an exclu-
sion.
(4) Copyright should be vested initially in the employer only with
respect to those works which are closely connected with the
employer's business. Since the works may be used commercially
in a number of ways other than in their use in the employer's
business, it can be argued that the employee should be the
beneficiary of such use.,
(5) The traditional rationale of copyright should apply to public
figures as well as to others. If allowing writers the financial
benefit of their originality encourages both creativity and publi-
cation, the promotion of these ends would seem even more
justifiable in the case of men in the public eye. 57
56. For a case imposing this view see Bouccicault v. Fox, 3 Fed. Cas. 977,
986 (No. 1,691) (C.C. N.Y., 1862), where the court said, "The title to literary
products is in the author whose intellect has given birth to the thoughts hnd
wrought them into the composition unless he has transferred that title, by contract,
to another."
57. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954), where the Supreme Court
has interpreted the basic constitutional copyright clause in this language: "The
economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors in 'Science and the Useful Arts.' Sacrificial days devoted to such creative
activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered."
21
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(6) There is a great public interest in having qualified men in the
public service and unless they are protected in their literary
efforts, they may lose incentive or hesitate to accept Government
positions."
(7) Unless the test "part of his official duties" is used, there will
exist no definitely ascertainable standard for determination when
a Government employee would be entitled to obtain copyright
protection of his literary products except in rare instances when
such products have absolutely no bearing upon his official duties
and no Government time is used.
On the other hand, among the arguments in favor of restricting the
Government employee's right to copyright are:
(1) Government employees will be encouraged to use Government
time and facilities to advance their own interest.
(2) The Government provides the facilities, the compensation, and
the germ for the idea involved in the resultant literary product.
(3) The Government, as an employer, is entitled to the actual
physical and mental work of the employee; therefore, it deserves
the resultant literary fruits of that work.
(4) Since a well informed electorate is essential to the functioning
of a democratic government, statements of great current in-
terest in areas of public concern, although otherwise copy-
rightable, should because of their interest be free of the
monopolistic limitations of copyright.
In investigating the preceding policy arguments, both pro and con,
probably the most influential upon the courts have been numbers five
and six in favor of the Government employee. The courts have shown
a restraint from tampering with the rights of Government employees, on the
grounds that they might interfere with free enterprise. Moreover, an
individual has a greater incentive to work when the resultant gains will
accrue to him, rather than to others. Thus, the public may receive bene-
fits through the copyright work of a Government employee that it would
never have received if individual initiative had not been encouraged by
permitting the Government employee to get a copyright.
58. Public Affairs Associates v. Rickover, 177 F. Supp. 601, (D.D.C. 1959),
reversed and remanded on other grounds, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960). "His
rights are not affected by the fact he may be a Government officer or employee. In
fact it is in the public interest for the Government to encourage intellectual de-
velopment of its officers and employees, and to look with favor upon them making
literary and scientific contributions. It is a matter of common knowledge that this
course is followed by private industry."
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One wonders whether the courts, in holding that the employee has
full freedom to copyright unless the work in question was produced as
part of his specific official duties, are using such a test by necessity, as
the argument in number seven seems to suggest. If courts used an "in
connection" test, such a test would become a matter of degree and de-
grees are often hard to draw. Each case would involve equitable considera-
tions and there would be no set standards. On the other hand a look at
whether the material was produced as part of the employees official
duties establishes a much more definite criterion.
At the present time, the situation involving the right of copyright
in Government employees, has not raised a serious conflict. But it may in
the future. The fact that both a District and a Circuit court in a recent
case gave expanded treatment to the Government employee situation
indicates the issue to be of considerable consequence.
Any controversy which may arise in the future will stem from one
source - indefiniteness. Presently the copyright statute offers no help.
It could be amended to specifically cover Government employees. But this
might result in straight-jacketing many Governmental departments which
may desire to pursue a policy of free copyright privilege in their employees
if the needs of their department so dictate. Similarly, an executive order
could be issued, specifically covering Government employees as was done
in the patent field. But here again, there is too blanket of coverage.
Flexibility would be sacrificed at the expense of definiteness. Perhaps the
remaining branch of the Government, the judiciary, should draw the line
as it did in Rickover. But this would necessarily involve an ad hoc
approach and indefiniteness, rather than definiteness, would be the rule.
The majority of courts have, it is true, formulated a seemingly definite
test: The Government employee is entitled to a copyright unless the
material in question is produced as part of his official duties. However,
courts, in carrying out this test, must look to the departments of Govern-
ment for which these officials acted for guidance as to the employee's
duties and power of copyright. And herein lies the solution. When the
courts look to each department there should be a definite ascertainable
standard on which they can rely. Therefore it is proposed that any
remedy to be applied in the Government employee situation, should be
applied at the departmental level. Here the individual peculiarities and
needs of the various departments can be met. For example, the Defense
Department could, within Constitutional limits, impose its own policies
as to its particular employees; the Agriculture Department likewise could
effect its own policy. 'The desired amount of flexibility would thus be
achieved.
The regulations of the various departments must be definite, however.
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the Defense Department 9 and those of the Navy Department.6 0  It
noted these regulations at the beginning of its opinion, but did not dis-
cuss them nor call upon them as an aid in rendering its decision. The
reason for this was obvious. The regulations were as indefinite as the
question the court was trying to decide.
Therefore it is suggested that since the Government is an employer
which acts through various departments, each department should spell
out its position as to its employees' literary efforts. They should dispense
with such vague standards as "in connection with official duties" and set
forth precisely the duties from which a privilege of copyright in the em-
ployee can or cannot ensue.6 ' Even in departments where a copyright
conflict is only a remote possibility, the department should take a definite
stand. A simple regulation, "All officials in this department have com-
plete freedom to copyright", would avoid numerous conflicts in situations




Government publications are denied the privilege of copyright under
the Copyright Statute. Such a position seems admirable in view of the
fact that our society has always championed the free dissemination of
ideas. However there is need for a precise definition of the term
"Government publication". Does this mean actual printing, or merely
publication under Government auspices? The statute is vague. The cases
give little clarification.
Where the Government employee is involved, courts have generally
favored him, allowing wide latitude in which to copyright material con-
nected with his Government service. The result is laudable, for in-
dividual initiative should be encouraged, as society will be the ultimate
beneficiary of such effort. However, again indefiniteness rules. Both the
59. The Department of Defense directive was as follows: "Writing for Publica-
tion by Defense Personnel, as Individuals. Personnel of the Department of Defense,
military and civilian, who write for outside publication not in connection with their
official duties on any subject or in any form shall ascertain that such activity will
not interfere or conflict in any way with their regularly assigned duties. Such activity
will not be conducted during normal working hours, or accomplished with the use of
Department of Defense facilities, or personnel ... "60. The Naval regulations provided: "Persons in the naval service desiring topublish articles on professional, political, or international subjects in accordance with
the provisions of this regulation shall cause their signatures to appear on such articles,
together with a statement to the effect that the opinions or assertions contained
therein are the private ones of the writer and are not to be construed as official or
reflecting the views of the Navy Department or the naval service at large."61. See Shook v. United States, 238 F.2d 952 (6th Cir. 1956), which calls
attention to the fact that all government agencies involved in scientific work nowhave uniform patent regulations which substantially affect the patent rights of the
person employed in these agencies.
[VOL. 6
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Government employee and the public are entitled to know their respec-
tive positions. Controversy, as in the Rickover case, should be avoided.
The solution would seem to be best implemented at the departmental
level. When a department of the Government hires an employee, and his
work may in any way involve creative talents, the employee's right to
copyright should either be set forth in the employment contract or
impliedly incorporated in it by way of reference to departmental regula-
tions.
John V. Hasson
FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT-
CERTIORARI PRACTICE-REVIEW OF THE SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
Once again the United States Supreme Court is the center of contro-
versy. This time it is the Court's handling of Federal Employers' Liability
Act' cases that has drawn criticism from outside the Court and resulted in
a substantial split within the Court itself. The Court has been accused
of abuse of discretion in granting certiorari in these cases, of subverting
the law of negligence, of wasting its time on trivial decisions to the harm
of more important ones, and of changing the basis of liability under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act from common law negligence to absolute
liability. Specifically, the main objections to the Court's current practice
are two: (1) the Court should not review Federal Employers Liability
Act cases where the sole issue is the sufficiency of evidence, and (2) the
Court has adopted the scintilla rule in Federal Employers Liability Act
cases. This comment will attempt to analyze these two objections.
I.
CERTIORARI AND THE COURT
A.
The Effect of the Court's Workload
The main objection to the recent certiorari practice in Federal Em-
ployers Liability Act cases is that in almost all these cases the main issue
is the sufficiency of evidence to reach a jury or sustain a jury verdict. Ac-
cordingly, it is argued that these inconsequential cases take up valuable
time better spent on consideration of important constitutional decisions
and that as a result of this practice the calibre of opinions emanating from
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the Court has declined.2 Whether or not the Court is overloaded is dis-
puted even among its own members 3 but it seems that this issue of the
Court's workload has received attention out of proportion to its importance.
If the petition for certiorari has merit, certiorari should be granted no
matter how busy the Court may be. And if there is no merit to the
petition, certiorari should be denied even if it is the only petition filed.
Although it is true that certiorari jurisdiction is discretionary and that
the workload of the Court may be a factor for consideration in some cases
not of pressing constitutional moment, the majority of petitions for
certiorari should be passed upon without considering the effect on the
workload of the Court. It may be argued that since there is no pressing
constitutional problem in the majority of Federal Employers Liability
Act cases, it is precisely in these cases that the workload of the Court
should be a prime factor for consideration. The answer to this con-
tention is two-fold: (1) that at least four Justices view these cases
as presenting an important seventh amendment issue,4 and (2) even
assuming arguendo the Court is overworked, Federal Employers Liability
Act cases are not time consuming.5 Therefore, this comment will not
consider in detail the workload of the Court in the analysis of its certiorari
policy in Federal Employers Liability Act cases.
B.
The History and Theory of Certiorari and the Rule of Four
The statutory writ of certiorari was first introduced as an ordinary
mode of review in the appellate practice of the Supreme Court by the
Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891.8 As explained by Chief Justice
Taft:
"The Act of 1891 introduced into the appellate system a discre-
tionary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over certain classes of
cases. It proceeded on the theory that so far as litigants were
concerned, their rights were sufficiently protected by having one trial
in a Court of first instance and one appeal to a court of appeal, and
that an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States should be
allowed only in cases where considerations would be in the public
interest.
7
2. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ; Hart, The Supreme Court Term - 1958 Term - Forward: The Time
Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. Rv. 84 (1959).
3. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R., supra note 2; Hart, supra note 2; Contra,
Cohen, Justice Douglas: A Law Clerk's View, 26 U. Cni. L. Rgv. 6, 7-8 (1958);
Douglas, The Supreme Court and Its Case Load, 45 CORNgLL L.Q. 401 (1960).
4. Inman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 361 U.S. 138 (1959).
5. Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 361 U.S. 15, 16 (1959) (Douglas, J., Con-
curring).
6. 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (codified in various sections of 28 U.S.C.).
7. Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms in the Administration of Civil Justice in
the Federal Courts, 57 AM. L. Riv. 1, 4 (1923).
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The purpose of this discretionary procedure was to attempt to ease the
workload of the Court by allowing the Court itself a measure of control
over its calendar. The Act of 1891 proved insufficient to ease the work-
load so Congress passed the Act of September 6, 1916,8 the purpose of
which was to eliminate the large number of cases engendered by the
newly enacted Federal Employers Liability Act. Still faced with a grow-
ing backlog of cases in the early 1920's the Court itself urged Congress
to extend the Court's discretionary jurisdiction. The result was the
Judiciary Act of 1925 which left the Court free in most instances to de-
termine its own docket.9
The theories behind the Acts of 1891, 1916, and 1925 were: (1) that
a single review is normally adequate protection of a litigant's rights, 10
(2) the function of the Supreme Court is not to remedy individual wrongs
but to decide issues of wide public or governmental interest which are
of precedent value, and (3) the Court has the object of settling
conflicting decisions among the Circuit Courts of Appeals." In order
to accomplish these ends, Congress gave the Court control over a large
part of its calendar. The Court was free to use its discretion in deciding
whether or not it would grant the petitions for certiorari. But this dis-
cretion does not mean that the Court has an absolute, whimsical freedom
to grant or deny the petitions. By "discretionary" jurisdiction is meant
the exercise of sound judicial discretion after study and according to
recognized principles. 12 These principles were promulgated in Rule 19,
of the Revised Rules of the Supreme Court.13
8. 39 Stat. 726 (1916), 28 U.S.C. § 338, 334 (1952), repealed by 62 Stat. 997(1948).
9. 43 Stat. 936 (1925) 48 U.S.C. § 645, 864 (1952). For instances where appeal
to the Supreme Court remains a matter of right see 28 U.S.C. § 1251-57 (1952).
10. Taft, supra note 7, at 4.
11. Comment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 450, 453 (1958).
12. 1924 Senate Hearings 32. See also, Leiman, The Rule of Four, 57 CoLUM.
L. REv. 974, 980 (1957)..
13. Rule 19, Revised Rules of the Supreme Court, 74 Sup. Ct. 931 (1954).
1. A review of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial dis-
cretion and will be granted only where there are special and important reasons
therefore. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the
court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered:
(a) Where a state court has decided a federal question of substance not
theretofore determined by this court, or has decided in a way probably not
in accord with applicable decisions of this court.
(b) Where a court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with
the decision of another court of appeals on the same matter; or has decided
an important state or territorial question in a way in conflict with applicable
state or territorial law; or has decided an important question of federal law
which has not been, but should be, settled by this court; or has decided
a federal question in a way in conflict with applicable decisions of this
court; or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to
call for an exercise of this court's power of supervision.
2. The same general considerations outlined above will control in respect
of petitions for writs of certiorari to review judgments of the Court of Claims,
of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, or any other court whose deter-
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Thus certiorari will not be granted merely to do justice in an indi-
vidual case14 or to review evidence and discuss specific facts. 15 It is granted
"in the interest of law, not in the interest of particular parties."'16 There-
fore it will be granted only if the case fits into one of the following cate-
gories: (1) cases presenting conflicts among the circuits, (2) those
containing important issues of constitutional or public law and (3) cases
in which the lower court decision appears to be grossly erroneous or
unjust.'7
The result of this development has been a metamorphosis of the Court
from a Court of highest appeal to "a political institution in whose keeping
lies the destiny of a great nation.' 8 The Court has become the navigator
of the ship of state, the engineer of social policy. It should not bother
itself with the ordinary, run of the mill private law problems because
"What makes the work of the Supreme Court of such moment
to the people of this country is, not its common law decisions, but
those of a politico-legal nature in the field of constitutional law."' 9
Part and parcel of this discretionary jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court is the "rule of four". 20 The rule means that certiorari will always
be granted as long as four Justices think that it should.2' Thus a doubting
Justice will respect the judgment of his brethren that the case does con-
cern issues important enough for the Court's consideration and adjudica-
tion.22 This does not mean that the Court has decided to dispose of the
case on its merits, but only that it will give the case fuller consideration.2 3
After fuller consideration of the case, the Court may decide that certiorari
was improvidently granted24 because of considerations which were not
previously manifest or fully understood. 25
14. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957) (dissent).
15. United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220 (1925).
16. 11 ALI PROCEEDINGS 313 (1934) (Chief Justice Hughes' Address).
17. See comment, 43 CORNS-LL L.Q. 450, 459-63 where these categories are dis-
cussed.
18. SCHWARTZ, THg SUPURM COURT 141 (1957).
19. Ibid. See also Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 525 (1957)
where Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, adopts the view that the Supreme Court should
formulate a body of public law for an evolving society.
20. Leiman, supra note 12, at 981.
21. Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the House on H.R. 8206,
68th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 45 at 7 (1925) (Justice Van Devanter's testimony).
22. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 529 (1957) (dissenting
opinion of J. Frankfurter).
23. Thus Justice Van Devanter stated: "Granting the writ means, and only
means that the court finds probable cause for a full consideration of the case in
ordinary course." 1924 Senate Hearings 20. But see, Note, 105 U. PA. L. Rev.
1084, 1086 (1957).
24. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 527 (1957) (dissent of
Frankfurter, J.)








PRESENT CERTIORARI POLICY IN F.E.L.A. CASES.
In increasing numbers in recent years, the Court has been granting
certiorari at the request of unsuccessful plaintiffs in Federal Employers
Liability Act cases involving nothing of importance except an appraisal
of the evidence in the particular litigation.26 The Court itself has indicated
that its purpose in reviewing these cases is to examine each case on its
own peculiar facts to make certain that the Congressional mandate that
plaintiff receive a jury trial is honored.2 7 Thus it would seem that Federal
Employers Liability Act plaintiffs have joined Negroes as groups which
are entitled to special consideration before the Court. In fact, one member
of the Court has spoken of the Court as a steward in these cases.28
Though the wisdom of the Court's course may be questioned, it is
not without precedent. As early as 1926 the Court declared that on
reviewing a judgment of a state court in a Federal Employers Liability
Act case, it would examine the record to determine whether or not the
evidence was sufficient in kind or amount to warrant a finding of negli-
gence.29 However, since that time there has been a radical change in
the social philosophy of the Court. Until about 1935 the Court was
clearly a fault liability Court. Thus the Court stated that in reviewing
a judgment of a state court in an action under the Federal Employers
Liability Act, it would give special consideration to the facts in order
to protect interstate carriers against unwarranted judgments. 30 The
present body, however, is clearly a loss distribution Court, careful of its
stewardship in these cases.31 Thus, although the pendulum has swung
to the other extreme concerning the underlying philosophy of the Act,
the certiorari practice of the present Court is not new.
However, granting certiorari in this class of cases seems to clearly
violate the policy behind the statutes which give the Court discretionary
jurisdiction.32 In support of the court's policy it is argued that the issue
is really not the sufficiency of evidence. Those Justices who vote for
granting certiorari justify their action on the grounds that this class of
cases presents an important constitutional issue, vis, whether or not plain-
26. Hart, supra note 2, at 96. See Baker v. Texas & Pacific Ry., 359 U.S. 227,
228 where the Court approvingly quotes the statement: "each case must be decided
on its own peculiar facts."
27. Baker v. Texas & Pacific Ry., supra note 26 at 228; Bailey v. Central
Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 354 (1943) ; Ringhiser v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 354
U.S. 900, 901-02 (1957) (Clark, J., dissenting).
28. Wilkerson v. MiCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring).
29. Chicago, Minn. & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Coogan, 271 U.S. 472 (1926).
30. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Saxon, 284 U.S. 458 (1932).
31. Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 69.
32. See text at note 15. In fact exclusion of F.E.L.A. cases from the scope of
the Court's obligatory jurisdiction was the main object of the Judiciary Act of 1916.
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tiff's right to a jury trial which is guaranteed by the seventh amendment
has been violated. 33
The only reference to a jury in the Federal Employers Liability Act
itself is in Sec. 3, which provides that contributory negligence does not
bar recovery under the Act but that "the damages shall be diminished
by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence" of the employee. 34
Since actions under the Act are essentially actions of common law negli-
gence, minus common law defenses, they are the type of action for which
a jury trial must be provided in the federal courts by virtue of the seventh
amendment. 35 The Act, however, gives state and federal courts concurrent
jurisdiction over actions brought under it.36 This raises the problem as to
the status of jury trial in actions brought in state courts.
Though state courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the substantive
rights involved are federal. The state courts, however, are free to follow
their own rules as to procedure.3 7 The problem of distinguishing substance
from procedure has led the Court to impose on state courts rules similar
to the "outcome determinative" test of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York.38
Thus, in actions under the Act brought in state courts, whenever any
state "procedure" would affect the federal substantive rights of the litigants
it must not be followed. 39
Early Federal Employers Liability Act cases allowed state courts
to follow their own procedure in the matter of jury trials. Thus the
Court held that the states were free in cases arising under the Act
to follow local procedure which permitted a jury to reach a verdict by
less than a unanimous decision,40 or which permitted a jury to be consti-
tuted with less than 12 persons. 41 In Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v.
Bombolis, 42 the Court declared that the seventh amendment applied only
to proceedings in federal courts and that state courts adjudicating claims
derived from federal law were free to follow their own procedure. It
was not certain for a time whether or not this implied that states could
33. The majority itself is not certain whether the precise issue is whether thejury function under F.E.L.A. has been invaded, Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R.,
352 U.S. 500, 501 (1957) (per Brennan, J.) or whether the issue is the guarantee of
a jury trial by the seventh amendment, Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 361 U.S. 15,
17 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
34. 35 Stat. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1952).
35. Hill, Substance and Procedure in State F.E.L.A. Actions - The Converse
of The Erie Problem?, 17 OiO Sr. L.J. 384, 394 (1956).
36. 36 Stat. 291, (1908) 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1952).
37. Dickenson v. Stiles, 246 U.S. 631, 633 (1918); Second Employers' Liability
Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 56 (1912).
38. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). See Missouri ex rel St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. v. Taylor,
266, U.S. 200, 209 (1924). For a discussion of whether or not the problem presented
is the converse of the Erie Problem see Hill, supra note 35.
39. Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1949) (state rules
of pleading) ; Central Vermont Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507 (1915) (burden of
proof as to contributory negligence) ; New Orleans & N.E. R.R. v. Harris, 247
U.S. 367, 372 (1917) (presumptions).
40. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916).
41. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Carnahan, 241 U.S. 242 (1916).
42. 241 U.S. 211, 218 (1916).
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dispense entirely with jury trials in Federal Employers Liability Act
cases.
43
However, as the Court shifted from one of fault liability to one of
loss distribution it became more solicitous concerning the employee's
right to a jury determination of the issues. Thus, later cases have made
it clear that the state must follow federal rules on jury trials in cases
arising under the Act because the jury trial is part and parcel of the remedy
created by the Act and it is too substantial a part of the rights accorded by
the Act to permit it to be classified as a mere local rule of procedure. 44
This seems to be the more rational conclusion since there is a clear federal
interest in seeing that there is uniformity in this litigation and in seeing
that a federally created right is not rendered impotent in the name of
local procedure.
But the presence or absence of a jury is not the main problem in
recent cases under the Act because, in fact, states have been providing
juries. The issue has been the allocation of the functions between judge
and jury, or to put it more precisely, what quantum of evidence is
necessary to raise a jury question. This is important since some of the
Justices evidently are of the opinion that in any proceeding brought under
the Act, if a judge keeps the case from the jury when he should have
submitted it, there is a violation of plaintiff's seventh amendment right
to a jury trial.
III.
THE EMERGENCE OF A RULE FOR SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
IN F.E.L.A. PROCEEDINGS.
There are two different rules applicable to determine whether or not
plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to prevent a directed verdict
against him. The scintilla rule holds that evidence of negligence, no
matter how slight, is sufficient to take the case to the jury. The alternative
rule is that, in order to get to the jury, plaintiff must present sufficient
evidence which, if believed, would justify a verdict for plaintiff.
It is clear that in Federal Employers Liability Act cases state courts
must follow the federal rule as to the sufficiency of evidence since this is
a matter of substance. 45 A uniform rule in this area is desirable so that
litigants under the Act receive similar treatment no matter where the
action is brought.4 6
It has long been held that the scintilla rule is not applicable to cases
brought under the act. Thus the weight of evidence must be more than a
43. Compare Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952) with Blair v.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 232 U.S. 600, 602 (1945).
44. Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., supra note 43 at 363.
45. Western & Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Hughes, 278 U.S. 496 (1929).
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scintilla before the case may properly be left to the jury.47 Evidence
sufficient to raise only a mere conjecture as to the negligence of the
defendant or as to whether such negligence was the proximate cause of
the injury is not sufficient to support a verdict of liability under the
Act. 4
8
In recent years the Court, while paying lip-service to the doctrine
that the scintilla rule does not prevail in cases brought under the Act,
has, in effect, adopted that rule. The main effect of this is to reduce the
amount of evidence necessary to support a verdict of liability under the
Act.
Although there is some indication that the Court in the early 1940's
intended to clarify the standard for submission of cases to the jury in
order to assure uniformity in litigation,49 they have abandoned any such
attempt. The course the Court has taken requires that it review every
single Federal Employers Liability Act case where the issue is the suf-
ficiency of evidence. Thus the Court is apparently willing, if not eager,
to decide each case on its particular facts under the guise of protecting
plaintiff's right to a jury trial.5 0 If any general conclusion can be reached
from these cases it is that "plaintiff wins".
Since the Court has failed to enunciate any general principles govern-
ing the submission of cases to the jury, a review of the cases under the
act would be inconclusive. Suffice it to say that from 1939 to 1957, while
not expressly overruling the doctrine that the scintilla rie does not apply,
the Court has sufficiently undermined it to lead this writes to believe that
it no longer controls in Federal Employers Liability Act litigation.5 1
This became manifest with the Court's opinion in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific
R.R.52
In the Rogers case the Missouri Supreme Court reversed a jury
verdict for petitioner on the grounds that petitioner's evidence did not
support a finding that the railroad was liable. The Missouri Court in
testing for causation used what is termed the "but for" test. Thus it
declared: "The test of whether there is a causal connection [between the
negligence and the injury] is that, absent the negligent act would the
injury have occurred.153 If it would have, then, the negligence is not the
cause of the injury. However, the "but for" test can be effectively used
to determine causation only where there is a single cause. It is ineffective
if multiple causation has produced an effect.
47. Brady v. Southern Ry., supra note 46 at 479; Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v.
Groeger, 266 U.S. 521, 524 (1925).
48. Ibid.
49. See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54 (1943) ; Note, 69 HARv.
L. Rv. 1441, 1450 (1956).
50. Baker v. Texas & Pacific Ry., 359 U.S. 227, 228 (1959).
51. See annot. at 4 L. Ed. 2d 1787; Alderman, What The New Supreme Court
Has Done To The Old Law of Negligence, 18 LAW & CON1T4MP. PROB. 110, 170
et seq. (1953).
52. 352 U.S. 500 (1957).
53. Rogers v. Thompson, 284 S.W.2d 467, 471 (Mo. 1955).
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Under the Act, however, the negligence does not have to be the sole
or even the substantial cause of the accident. It is sufficient if the injury
resulted "in whole or in part from the negligence" of the employer.54
The United States Supreme Court therefore reversed and declared that
it is not necessary that defendant's negligence be the sole cause of the
injury, but it is sufficient if it played even the slightest part.
"Judicial appraisal of the proofs to determine whether a jury
question is presented is narrowly limited to the single inquiry whether,
with reason, the conclusion may be drawn that negligence of the
employer played any part at all in the injury or death." 55
Notice that the issue there was not how much evidence of negligence
or of causation is necessary to get to the jury. The sole problem was
whether or not the railroad would be liable if its negligence was not the
sole cause of the accident but was merely a slight cause. It is a legal
question as to how much causation is necessary to render the railroad
liable for the injury. The holding that the slightest amount of causation
is sufficient is in keeping with the language of the Act and with previous
cases.
However, in subsequent cases there began a metamorphosis of this
rule from one of causation to one of sufficiency of evidence. It became
transformed from a rule that the slightest causation between the negli-
gence and the injury is sufficient to render the railroad liable, to a rule
that the slightest evidence of negligence or causation is sufficient to take
the case to the jury.
In Conner v. Butler6 the district court of appeals affirmed a directed
verdict for the railroad. Although the Court used ambiguous language, it
is evident that the sole issue was not causation but whether there was
sufficient evidence to reach the jury.5 7 The United States Supreme Court
in a per curiam decision reversed declaring that proofs were sufficient
to submit to the jury the question whether the negligence of the employer
played a part in producing petitioner's injury.58 As authority the Court
cited Rogers. But the issue in the Conner case was not one of causation.
To reach a situation where the Rogers "rule of reason" is applicable, there
must first be enough evidence of negligence or causation to reach a jury.
The implication of this and other per curiam decisions"9 is that now the
54. 35 Stat. 65 (1908) ; 53 Stat. 1404 (1939) ; 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1952).
55. Roger v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1957).
56. 109 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 1959).
57. "But even under that exacting test [The Rogers case] it is necessary to show
some negligence. . . . That requirement is not met by showing that an injury
occurred through the use'of a mechanism not shown to be defective, and which had
not been reported as defective, and with the reason for the accident not known."
Id. at 184.
58. Conner v. Butler, 361 U.S. 29 (1959).
59. See also Gibson v. Thompson, 355 U.S. 18 (1958); Honeycut v. Wabash
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slightest evidence of the slightest negligence which is the slightest cause
of an injury is sufficient to take a case to a jury.60
The de facto adoption of the scintilla rule seems to be clearly shown
by the unwitnessed death cases. 6' In Levender v. Kurn6 2 a switch tender
was found near the track with a fractured skull shortly after he had thrown
a switch to permit a passenger train to back into a station. There was
evidence showing that there was a mail hook hanging down loosely
on the outside of the mail car of the backing train; considering the height
and swing-out of the hook, and the existence of an uneven mound of
cinders and dirt near the track, on which the deceased was probably
standing, it was possible that he had been struck on the head by the hook.
However, there was contrary evidence indicating that he could not possibly
have been hit by the hook, and possibly, might have been murdered by
one of the many tramps frequenting the switch yards. A verdict for
plaintiff was reversed by the Supreme Court of Missouri. 63 The United
States Supreme Court reversed holding that there was sufficient evidence
to support the verdict and the fact that the jury's verdict involved specula-
tion and conjecture did not make it objectionable so long as it had a basis
in the evidence. 64
The above case is a clear break with precedent 5 but the Court still
has not admitted that it is adopting the scintilla rule. The Court has
been unable or unwilling to formulate generalized principles which are
intelligible to state or lower federal courts to guide their decisions on the
question of submission of cases to the jury.66 The confusion engendered
by the Court's course of action is aptly illustrated by the remarks of Judge
Zimmerman of the Ohio Supreme Court in the case of Harris v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R.67
"Evidence which raises only a speculation of negligence on the
part of a defendant-employer is not sufficient to support a verdict
imposing liability on him....
"We are aware that the Supreme Court of the United States
in recent years has been liberal, to say the least, in upholding the
recovery of damages by injured employees in actions brought under
the Federal Employers Liability Act. However, by applying the
principles of law above outlined, which we assume have not been
60. Hart, supra note 2, at 97; Harris v. Pennsylvania, 361 U.S. 15, 27 (1959).
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
61. Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645 (1946); Stinson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co., 355 U.S. 62 (1957). But see, Chicago, M. & St. Paul R. Co. v. Coogan, 271
U.S. 472 (1926); Kansas City S.R. Co. v. Jones, 276 U.S. 303 (1928); New York,
C.R. Co. v. Ambrose, 280 U.S. 486 (1930); Atchison T. & S.F. R.R. Co. v. Toops,
281 U.S. 351 (1930); Atchison T. & S.F. R.R. Co. v. Saxon, 284 U.S. 458 (1932).
62. 327 U.S. 645 (1946).
63. 345 Mo. 196, 189 S.W.2d 253 (1945).
64. 327 U.S. 645 (1946).
65. See annot. at 4 L. Ed. 2d 1787, 1813-14.
66. See Hart, supra note 2 at 97; McGruder, The Trials and Tribulations of an
Intermediate Appellate Court, 44 CORNtLL L.Q. 1, 10-11 (1958).
67. 168 Ohio St. 582, 156 N.E.2d 822 (1959).
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abandoned, to the instant action, we are of the opinion that plaintiff
herein failed to make out a case of liability against the defendant, . . .6 8
Needless to say Judge Zimmerman was overruled by a Supreme Court
per curiam opinion which did not mention sufficiency of evidence. Again
the Rogers case was cited although again the problem was not causation
but sufficiency of evidence.6 9 The result - confusion compounded.
Although it has been argued that the Court may have intended to
set a "mood" for the guidance of the lower courts,7" it seems evident
that what the court has done is to change its standard for the submission
of cases to the jury in Federal Employers Liability Act litigation.71 Call
it what you will, the present rule as to sufficiency of evidence is that the
slightest amount (scintilla?) is sufficient to take a case to the jury.
However, the Court has not expressly accepted the scintilla rule and
it seems that there may be a reason for this. Under the scintilla rule it is
possible that there will be enough evidence to get to a jury but not enough
on which a jury could find for a plaintiff. Thus a jury verdict would be
open to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. But if the scintilla rule is
rejected, at least in name, the rule is that to reach a jury plaintiff must
produce sufficient evidence on which a jury could base its verdict for
plaintiff. Technically, under the latter rule, if there is enough evidence
to get to a jury there can never be a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Therefore, in saying, in effect, that the slightest evidence of negligence
is sufficient to take the case to the jury, the Court is getting the benefits
of the scintilla rule in getting the case to the jury. But in keeping, at
least in name, the rule that to get to the jury there must be sufficient
evidence on which a jury could find for plaintiff, the Court prevents a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The effect of this seems to be a rule that the slightest evidence of the
slightest negligence which is the slightest cause of the injury is sufficient
evidence to sustain a jury verdict for plaintiff. The practical result is that
virtually all cases under the Act must be submitted to the jury and that
no jury verdict can be overturned.
IV.
THE COURT, CERTIORARI AND JUSTIcE FRANKFURTER.
As we have seen, the result of the current Court practice in cases
arising under the Act is that the Court, in its capacity as "steward,"
will continue to grant certiorari to review the evidence of particular cases.
68. Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 168 Ohio St. 582, 156 N.E.2d 822 (1959)
(emphasis added).
69. Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 361 U.S. 15 (1959).
70. Note, 69 HARV. L. Rev. 1441, 1451 (1956).
71. See Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 652-53 (1946). But cf. Tennant v.
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It seems clear that this practice is contrary to the policy behind certiorari
jurisdiction. But it would seem that this, in and of itself, is not sufficient
justification for Justice Frankfurter's refusal to take part in the con-
sideration of these cases. It is also interesting to note the different
philosophy of Mr. Justice Harlan on this point.
Both Justice Frankfurter and Justice Harlan agree that certiorari
should not be granted in this class of cases. But once certiorari has been
granted, Justice Harlan feels bound to abide by the "rule of four." He
believes, absent new considerations which were not taken into account
at the time of the grant, that the case should be disposed of on the
merits since it is properly before the Court.72 To allow five Justices to
dismiss a case without a decision on the merits would, to him, render the
"rule of four" meaningless. 73
Justice Frankfurter, on the other hand, argues that the "rule of
four" merely means that four of the nine Justices believe, on the basis
of the petition for certiorari, that the case is one that the Court should
consider further. It does not mean that the Court has absolutely chosen
to decide the case on its merits. 74 In addition, he points out that the
rule is not a command of Congress or a strict standard for determining
discretionary jurisdiction. It is only:
"... a working rule devised by the Court as a practical mode
for determining that a case is deserving of review, the theory being
that if four Justices find a legal question of general importance is
raised, that is ample proof that the question has much importance.17 5
Thus the basic issue between Justice Frankfurter and the majority is
whether, after four Justices vote to grant certiorari, the case should be
disposed of on its merits or whether the majority is still free to decide
to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.
Both Justice Frankfurter 76 and Justice Harlan 77 agree that the con-
siderations which would move the Court to dismiss the writ should be
considerations which were not apparent at the time of the grant. Yet it
seems clear that, in this class of cases, the Court was aware at the time
certiorari was granted that it would have to review the evidence and thus
no new considerations have arisen. Still Justice Frankfurter insists on dis-
missing the cases on the grounds that certiorari was improvidently granted.
It is unreasonable to say that the five Justices who voted against
granting certiorari can still vote to dismiss a writ as improvidently granted
after the case has been heard. To say this is "to pround a theory by which
the rule of four becomes no more than a majority's tolerance of the
72. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 560 (1957). The majority
concurred in this portion of Justice Harlan's opinion.
73. Id. at 560-61.
74. Id. at 529.
75. Ibid.
76. Id. at 526 n.4, 527-28.
77. Id. at 559.
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minority's desire to hear a case." a78 It further eliminates the advantage,
noted by Justice Van Devanter, 79 of enabling the parties to learn at the
outset whether their case will be decided.
The Court itself seems to recognize that a Justice who voted to deny
the writ cannot, after argument vote to dismiss the writ as improvidently
granted. Only a Justice who voted to grant certiorari has that privilege.
8 0
This seems necessary to prevent the "rule of four" from being a hollow,
time-consuming ritual. A necessary corollary to this is that the "rule of
four" should be applied throughout the entire proceedings. So as long
as at all times any four Justices think that the case should be disposed of
on its merits, the entire Court should turn its attention to the merits of
the case.
Justice Frankfurter, however, insists on refusing to consider the
merits of these cases because of his belief that certiorari was improvidently
granted. He has long voted to dismiss the writs and has noted his position
in his opinions, but until the case of Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad,
he had also taken part in the disposition of the case on its merits. No one
would question his right to note his view on the certiorari practice of the
Court. What can be questioned is his position after the Rogers case that
he would not even take part in the consideration of the merits of a case
where he thought certiorari was improvidently granted. He seeks to justify
his stand in the following language:
"In the usual instance, a doubting Justice respects the judgment
of his brethren that the case does concern issues important enough
for the Court's consideration and adjudication. But a different situa-
tion is presented when a class of cases is systematically taken for
review. Then a Justice who believes that such cases raise insignificant
and unimportant questions . . . cannot forego his duty to dissent to
the Court's action." 8'
But it is not his right to dissent that is questioned; rather it is his manner
of registering his dissent. Once he notes his dissent on the certiorari
practices of the Court, he should take part in considering the merits of
the case.
If by failing to take part in the consideration of the merits, Justice
Frankfurter is protesting a mistake in judgment on the part of his
brethren his position is seriously open to question.8 2 However, he has
hinted that there may be more to his position. In McBride v. Toledo
Terminal Co.8 3 he declared in dissent:
"This Court from time to time is compelled to hold that a
federal court has abused some discretionary power. . . . Since this
78. Leiden, supra note 12, at 989.
79. 1924 Senate Hearings 30.
80. United States v. Shannon, 342 U.S. 288, 298 (1952).
81. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 529 (1957).
82. Leiden, supra note 12 at 991.
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case underscores reasons for declining to associate myself in what I
regard as a misuse of the power vested in a minority of this Court in
granting certiorari, I have no choice but to conclude that the writ
of certiorari in this case has been improvidently granted and, having
been granted, should be dismissed."8 4
The intimation is that the Court, in granting certiorari to these Federal
Employers Liability Act cases, is exceeding the allowable limits of its
discretion. The problem then becomes a jurisdictional one8 5 and there
is no obligation to vote on the merits in a case which a Justice believes
the Court has no power to decide.8 If this is Justice Frankfurter's view
he is on a more solid ground.
V.
SOCIOLOGICAL CHANGES AND JUDICIAL LEGISLATION.
A.
The Law and Sociology.
The Court's evident adoption of the scintilla rule is not the most
disturbing aspect of its recent action in Federal Employers' Liability
Act cases. However, it would facilitate the disposition of lower court
cases and cut down the number of petitions for certiorari if the Court
would admit that it has adopted the scintilla rule or else enunciate standards
to guide lower courts.87 Nor should the Court's de facto lowering of the
quantum of proof necessary to prove negligence cause alarm. Although
one may question the wisdom of these actions, one can not doubt that
the Court can change the rule. It is a proper function of the Court to set
and change rules as to the sufficiency of evidence and the quantum of
proof as long as they they do not thereby change the standard of care.
However, the Court's apparent sojourn into the field of social legis-
lation is clearly open to question. The Court is saying not only that we
need less evidence of fault to find the employer liable; but also that less
fault itself is necessary to constitute negligence. The Court is thus, in
effect, raising the standard of care. It may not be absolute liability, as the
Court is wont to protest,88 but the fault necessary to render the railroads
liable is certainly a lesser fault than traditionally has been the case in
common law negligence. If it is not absolute liability, it is the next best
thing.
84. Id. at 519-20. (emphasis added).
85. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 528 (1957). There Justice
Frankfurter states that he regards these cases as "not properly before the Court".
86. See Konigsber v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 274 (1957) (dissent)
Leiden, supra note 12, at 991.
87. Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 361 U.S. 15, 27 (1959).
88. Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 62 (1949).
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In this country, fault has traditionally been the basis of negligence. 89
According to this approach, forseeability of harm characterized negligence. 90
Liability was thus based on personal fault and was a penalty for dis-
obedience. 91 In addition it was obviously felt that this approach would
encourage a person to take greater care in performing an act.
This moralistic92 concept of negligence reflected the religious and
social views of the times. This was the era of the primacy of the individual.
Individualism was itself but a part of the "Protestant ethic" which viewed
idleness as sinful.9 3 The individual was responsible for his acts and did
not owe his neighbor a living. The survival of the fittest was now being
applied to economic life. Even fault liability infringed some on the social
Darwinism of the times but it did not emasculate it. It was the era of risk
taking and rapid industrial growth. 94 Industrial growth was something
to be desired and it was not to be overburdened with losses from risks which
were necessary for growth. 95 The "invisible hand" controlled the market
and each person would get from the economic system according to his
contribution thereto. The government could not artifically provide security,
economic or otherwise. And even if it could, it should not. Security could
be purchased only at the price of freedom, and freedom was the basis of
the way of life.9 6
This social and economic philosophy, in various hues and shades, held
sway until the Great Depression. But since the advent of the New Deal,
the American character has undergone a tremendous change. 97 We have
acquired a greater social awareness - a social conscience.98 The basic prin-
ciple of life has changed from individual freedom to individual security. The
movement has caused one writer to comment: "Next to his health the
American is most concerned about his security-".99 Part and parcel of
this security seeking has been a slackening of risk taking.100 Thus when
individual freedom and individual security come into conflict, individual
security now prevails.
This social revolution could not help but have reprecussions in the
law. The preoccupation with individual freedom, which was inconsistent
with strict liability, no longer was a roadblock. The' social conscience
would seem to require that the loss be distributed and not lie where it
falls, even though there be no fault. In the field of jurisprudence the
89. Loss-Shifting And Quasi-Negligence: A New Interpretation of the Palsgraf
Case, 8 U. CHI. L. Rv. 729, 730 (1941).
90. Ibid.
91. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 82 (1881).
92. Id. at 79.
93. LERNER, AMERICA As A CIVILIZATION 297-98 (1957). See generally WEBER,
ThE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT Or CAPITALISM (1930).
94. Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CALIr. L. Rev. 369i 397 (1950).
95. Ryan v. New York Cent. R.R., 35 N.Y. 210, 216-17 (1866).
96. Lerner, supra note 93, at 49.
97. Ibid.
98. Goals For Americans 249 (1960).
99. Lerner, supra note 93, at 129.
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sociological school has come to the fore.' 0' Law is essentially functional, a
tool for social engineering.10 2 The emphasis is on the satisfaction of needs
and on reflecting current mores.
"Law, performs its function adequately only when it is suited
to the way of life of a people. With social change comes the im-
perative demand that law shall satisfy the needs which change has
created ..... .We are coming to realize more Completely that law
is not an end, but a means to an end-. . . , that end is to be attained
through the reasonable accommodation of law to changing economic
and social needs ... 103
B.
Fault Liability vs. Risk Distribution.
The Supreme Court's conduct in the Federal Employers Liability
Act cases seems to be an example of applied sociological jurisprudence. Al-
though negligence was originally the basis for liability, the Court has up-
dated the Act to reflect the current "way of life of a people". 04 Liability for
fault under the Act has been replaced, in effect, by liability without fault, or
more accurately by a theory of loss distribution. The rationalization of
the theory of distributing loss without considering fault can be phrased
thusly: One who should know that his activity, even though carefully
prosecuted, may harm others, should treat this harm as a cost of his
activity. If the activity is a business activity, this cost item will affect
pricing and will be passed on to the consumer, spread so thinly that no one
will be seriously affected. The enterprise can normally control this cost
by resort to liability insurance, which substitutes a fixed premium for
ruinous runs of bad luck.10 5The first reason given for distributing the loss is that it aids the
businessman. Organized mechanical enterprise is necessary but dangerous.
A certain amount of consequent harm to others in the operation of such
enterprise is unavoidable. In fact, the application of the general principle
of fault may prove unduly expensive and may discourage industrial de-
velopment generally believed of more ultimate importance to society than
the avoidance of this inevitable harm to certain of its members. Society
should not penalize enterprise for its negligence in operating with full
realization of the harm it will inevitably cause, after having permitted and
even encouraged such activity. Likewise society cannot let the loss remain
on the innocent individual suffering it. The answer is to impose the loss
101. See generally RUSCHLEIN, Jt)RISPRUDENC - ITs AMERICAN PROPHETS
126-154 (1951).
102. Id. at 129.
103. Stone, The Common Law In the United States, 50 HARV. L. REv. 4, 11
(1936).
104. This is judicial legislation to be sure, but within prescribed limits thejudge "performs essentially the function of the legislator, and in a real sense makes
law". Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REv. 4, 11 (1936).
105. MORRIs, TORTs 247-48 (1953).
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on the persons who benefit from such enterprise. The enterprise can
treat the loss as a cost of doing business and pass it on to the consumer.'l 6
A second justification for loss distribution is the unfairness of allowing
the loss to remain on the innocent party who suffered it. These losses
fall initially on people who, as a class, can ill afford them and thus bring
great hardship upon the victims themselves and cause unfortunate reper-
cussions to society as a whole.10 7  Therefore losses should be shifted
from an inferior to a superior risk bearer.10 8 Something akin to a welfare
standard is introduced. 109
There is still another possible justification for loss distribution. This
theory can be used to implement a fiscal policy of economic stability. An
injury, in addition to money expended, causes unemployment and loss
of income. Insurance usually covers only the cost of medical treatment.
Unemployment benefits are merely nominal." 0 Giving the employee ad-
ditional compensation will increase his purchasing power and this is per-
haps more important than increased production. It is necessary, in order
to keep the "affluent society" from outproducing itself, to provide purchasers
for goods."'
For reasons that remain unarticulated, the Court has incorporated
the theory of loss distribution in Federal Employers' Act Litigation. True
it is in modified form. It is not absolutely strict liability. But the view
has been adopted that the slightest evidence of the slightest negligence
playing the slightest part in causing an injury renders the railroad
liable." 2 Perhaps it is true that the Act presents a rude and unjust
scheme.' But is not reform a job for the legislature? Is the Court an
accurate barometer of current social mores? What about the minority, or
are they the majority, that prefer individual freedom to economic security?
The crab grass of economic security has not completely strangled the lawn
of person freedom. There are still those who are prepared to make severe
material sacrifice to preserve individual liberty. 1 4 The sanctity of the
individual and his personal freedom was recently given eloquent expression
by the Report of the President's Commission on National Goals:
"The acid test of successful democratic government is the degree
of effective liberty it makes to the individual. That criterion establishes
106. Loss-Shifting And Quasi-Negligence: A New Interpretation of the Palsgraf
Case, 8 U. CHI. L. Rev. 729, 734 (1941).
107. HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW Op TORTS vol. 2, § 13.2 (1956).
108. Ognall, Some Facts of Strict Tortious Liability in the United States and
Their Implication, 33 NOT" DAMn LAW 239, 269 (1957).
109. McBratney, New Trends Toward Liability Without Fault, 26 Rocxy MT.
L. Rev. 140, 152 (1953).
110. GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIATY 294 (1958).
111. Id. at 139-151 and 289-307.
112. Hart, supra note 2, at 97 n.29.
113. Stone v. New York, C. & St. Louis R.R., 344 U.S. 407, 410-11 (1953)
(dissent).
114. HAYEK, THE ROAD To SERFDOM 133 (1954); HOOK, POLITICAL POWER AND
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an order of values. Self-fulfillment is placed at the summit. All other
goods must be relegated to lower orders of priority; even personal
security and comfort must have less consideration."'15
Thus the Court has taken a course that many persons deplore and
fear. It is not a course that is required by law. If anything, existing law is
opposed to it. It is judicial legislation of the first rank. The Court,
like a benevolent despot, has decided what is best for the people. It is sub-
mitted that five members of the Supreme Court should not impose their
social and economic policy upon the nation as a whole. There are those
who would dissent but they have been disenfranchised. The ballot does
not reach the Court. A matter so important to the whole theory of
democracy" 6 should not be decided without giving the people of the
country opportunity to express their view. It should be decided in the
legislature. Judicial restraint is in order.
Justice Frankfurter, too, lacks a bit in judicial restraint in this matter.
It may not be out of place to notice that the rupture on the Court has
found its way into newspapers. This bodes ill as a precedent and seriously
damages the public image of the Court.
However Justice Frankfurter's true reason for refusing to consider
these cases on the merits would seem to be a political one. He has a keen
sense of history. His action seems to be an attempt to stir Congress from
its traditional lethargy in this matter, in the hopes that it will once more,
as in 1916, restrict the jurisdiction of the Court, at least in Federal Em-
ployers Liability Act litigation.
Congressional action seems the only sensible answer. The socioeconomic
cleavage on the Court is too wide to be breached. And a realignment will
merely be temporary and may only result in a return of the Court to a
fault-liability Court. This is clearly not a satisfactory answer. Congressional
action which completely deprives the Court of jurisdiction over cases
brought under the Act, except for construction of the statute, seems
the only reasonable solution. The rights of the parties in cases where
sufficiency of evidence is the sole issue can be amply protected by appoint-
ing an administrative board, or perhaps the eleventh circuit, as the highest
appellate court in these matters.
Joseph G. Manta
115. GOALs FOR AMERICANS 48 (1960).
116. One writer has phrased the underlying issue thusly: "The basic issue
therefore is not between two kinds of democracy. It is, I suggest, between two ways
of life. One aspires toward even greater freedom and equality, solving its difficulties
within the rules of the game which recognize the legitimacy of opposition.
The other has no place for opposition nor for freely given consent but concentrates
all power, political, economic, and educational, in the hands of a minority convinced
that it is a better judge of the interests of the vast majority of men and women
than they themselves." HOOK, POLITICAL POWER AND PERSONAL FREEDOM 35 (1959).
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